In the bilateral assignment problem, source a holds the amount ra of resource of type a, while sink i must receive the total amount xi of the various resources. We look for assignment rules meeting the powerful separability property known as Consistency: "every subassignment of a fair assignment is fair". They are essentially those rules selecting the feasible ‡ow minimizing the sum P i;a W (yia), where W is smooth and strictly convex.
The problem and the punchline
A preference relation over pro…les of variables (w 1 ; w 2 ; ) is separable in those variables, if a change a¤ecting only a subset of the variables can be evaluated in complete ignorance of the values of the other unchanged variables, as long as we know they do not change. This has obvious and well known advantages in terms of computational simplicity and the ability to decentralize choice. For tractability, most utility functions of empirical economic models are separable, and the same applies to standard de…nitions of social welfare as a preference relation over individual welfares (e.g., [18] ).
Fair division problems such as the one we study here call for a division rule, solving each problem in a given family of problems. Such rules are not necessarily derived from maximizing a social preference over the feasible allocations so the above notion of separability does not apply directly; however the widely studied properties called Consistency and Inverse Consistency (explained in the next paragraph, and de…ned in Section 3) convey a very similar idea without invoking a preference relation, social or otherwise. As we recall below, in the simple rationing problem any reasonable consistent rule actually maximizes a separable preference relation. Our results extend this connection between the two concepts to the bilateral assignment problem.
Bilateral assignment is one of the oldest models in Operations Research. In the shipping interpretation favoured in the ‡ow-graph literature ( [2] ), there is a set N of retailers (aka sinks) indexed by i, and a set A of warehouses (aka sources) indexed by a; warehouse a stores the amount r a of some commodity, while retailer i can absorb the total amount x i of commodity (irrespective of the warehouse they come from). Critically, the assignment problem is balanced : P N x i = P A r a . In the simple version we discuss here, there are no constraints on the ‡ow y ia from warehouse a to retailer i. Common instances of the assignment problem include dividing jobs (measured in hours) between workers, allocating students of di¤erent types (ethnic, academic) to schools, etc.. Consistency of a division rule means that, if it selects a ‡ow matrix [y ia ] N A to ship goods from warehouses in A to retailers in N , it will also select the submatrix [y ia ] N 0 A 0 in order to ship the corresponding goods from the subset A 0 of warehouses to the subset N 0 of retailers. In the words of Balinski and Young ([5] ), "every part of a fair allocation must be fair". Converse Consistency says that in order to check that the initial (large) ‡ow matrix is fair, it is enough to check that every 2 2 submatrix is fair. Taken together, Consistency and its inverse make local fairness equivalent to global fairness, with all the decentralization advantages of separable preferences.
Which assignment we deem the "fairest" depends of course upon the context. The most common principle is proportionality. For instance the numerous measures of segregation discussed in the literature (e.g., [10] ) view the proportional assignment as the ideal of zero segregation: each school should have the same mix of the various types of students, each type of job should have the same gender balance, and so on. But other fairness principles are out there as well: if the entry y ia is the load of a truck from the warehouse a to the retailer i, we may want to equalize the loads across all trucks, perhaps for e¢ ciency reasons; full equality is not feasible as soon as the x i or the r a are not identical, so we must pick the "most egalitarian" assignment according to some approximation criterion: for instance we can minimize the variance of the entries y ia , as in the Minimal Trade model of the transportation literature (see [11] ).
To …x ideas, and stress the connections of our model with the extensive literature on dividing a single commodity according to individual claims, the rationing or bankruptcy models (on which more below), we speak of the set of resources A and agents N . In this interpretation the agents observe passively the assignment selected by the benevolent manager, and care about its fairness; but unlike in the rationing problem we take as given the total resource allocated to each agent, so the agents care only about the distribution of the given total between the di¤erent resources. An alternative interpretation, in the spirit of the Operations Research literature in the two previous paragraphs, is the oneperson story of the manager who is bound by certain standards of rationality like Consistency and looks for a systematic principle to solve any assignment problem; in that view the individual retailers of the shipping story do not care anymore about the origin of their deliveries.
Our punchline is that if the manager accepts the Consistency axiom, and two additional fairness requirements 1 , he will end up using one of a fairly simple family of division rules.
The …rst fairness axiom is the standard "horizontal equity", requiring a symmetric treatment of the agents i, and the same for the resources a. The second is a natural yet powerful Monotonicity property: transferring resources from source a to source b results in a (weak) increase of the ‡ow y ib to each agent i (and a similar statement for transferring capacity from agent i to agent j). Together with Consistency, these properties essentially characterizes the class of assignment rules minimizing a separable sum P N A W (y ia ), where W is a smooth and strictly convex (anti)welfare function. We call these assignment rules welfarist. This result is strikingly similar to the famous DebreuGorman theorem ( [7] ) showing that, essentially, a separable preference relation as in the …rst paragraph above is represented by an additively separable utility U 1 (w 1 ) + U 2 (w 2 ) +
. The "essential" quali…cation, in our model as in Debreu-Gorman, refers to additional boundary and continuity assumptions that eliminate borderline solutions.
From a technical standpoint Young's Theorem ( [25] ) on the parametric representation of rationing rules is the most relevant to our result, because its statement is similar; moreover it is a key component of our proof. More on this in the next section, reviewing the relevant literature.
Section 3 de…nes the model and the Consistency axioms. Welfarist assignment rules are introduced in Section 4. They are consistent (CSY) as well as inverse consistent (CSY 1 ). A natural one-dimensional subset of such rules obtains by imposing Scale Invariance: then W is mostly a power function W q (z) = z q (Lemma 2). This family includes the minimal variance rule (W 2 (z) = z 2 ), and the proportional rule (W 1 (z) = z ln(z)). Section 5 introduces the monotonicity and boundary conditions used in our main result: the characterization theorem is stated in Section 6, where we also give a sketch of its proof. Section 7 gathers concluding comments and some open questions. All substantial proofs are in Section 8.
Related literature
The Consistency property appears …rst (under the name Uniformity) in the work of Balinski and Young on apportionment ( [5] ), then in a paper by Balinski and Demange on the proportional approximation of a given assignment ( [4] ). It has been applied to a variety of models, from solutions of cooperative games to competitive equilibrium, the allocation of indivisible goods, matching, and more. See [22] , [23] for an extensive discussion of the CSY and CSY 1 concepts and their versatile applications.
One instance where Consistency has proven particularly useful is the familiar rationing model: the amount r of a single resource must be divided between agents labeled i who each have a legitimate claim x i , but there is not enough resource to meet all claims: r < P N x i . Aumann and Maschler ( [3] ) use CSY to justify the rationing rule known as "Talmudic", then Young ([25] ) shows that a symmetric, continuous, and consistent rationing rule solves a separably additive program of the form arg min y P i V (x i ; y i ). This resembles our own welfarist rules solving arg min y P ia W (y ia ), though in our model the Consistency assumption applies in two dimensions hence has more bite. Two surveys on the rationing model are [14] and [21] .
The companion paper [15] develops a capacited version of the assignment problem, where a di¤erent exogenous constraint (lower and upper bounds) applies to each entry y ia . Taking for granted that the proportional assignment should be selected if it is compatible with the constraints, it shows that minimizing the total entropy P ia En(y ia ) is the uniquely consistent way to accomodate the constraints, if we do not endow them (the constraints) with any normative content.
The model of bipartite rationing, recently introduced by this author and Sethuraman ( [16] , [17] ) generalizes both the standard one-resource rationing model two paragraphs above and the assignment model here. Each retailer i in N has a total demand x i , each warehouse a in A has capacity r a , and we assume P N x i P A r a ; moreover transfers are con…ned to a given bipartite graph. The bipartite proportional method in [16] generalizes the proportional rule (2) here: assuming as in the previous paragraph that the rule must be proportional in any one-resource problem, it turns out that, once again, the only consistent way to extend it to multiple resources is by minimizing total entropy of the ‡ow.
In the current paper we are entirely agnostic about the assignment rule in the one-resource case, and our welfarist assignment rules include much more than the proportional rule. As explained in Section 7.2, it is a reasonable conjecture that our main characterization result can be extended to the bipartite rationing model. Erlanson and Szwagrzak ([8] ) discuss a generalization of standard rationing with multiples resources, where each agent has a claim on each type of resource (unlike here). They characterize a family of welfarist rationing rules similar to ours by requiring both Consistency and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. IIA is the familiar route to choice rules maximizing some preference relation, so the combination of CSY and IIA is very powerful. It does not apply to our model because the sets of feasible assignments in two distinct problems are never nested.
Assignment problems and rules
The sets N of agents (or sinks) and A of resources(or sources) are both …nite with generic elements i and a respectively. We use the notation z D = P d2D z d , and write iA, N a instead of fig A and N fag when this causes no confusion.
An assignment problem P = (N; A; x; r) speci…es the total allocation x i of each agent, so x 2 R N + the endowment r a of the resource of type a, so r 2 R A + meeting the budget balance equation x N = r A = s.
A feasible assignment is a matrix y 2 R N A + such that y iA = x i for all i 2 N , and y N a = r a for all a 2 A. We write P for the set of assignment problems, and (P ) for the set of feasible assignments of problem P . Note that P contains problems of arbitrary dimensions jN j and jAj.
An assignment rule selects y 2 (P ) for every P 2 P. We restrict attention to rules treating all agents, and all resources, symmetrically. We also require that a small change in the demands x i ; r a should have only a small in ‡uence on the solution.
If is a bijection of N , from the new name i to the old name (i), and y 2 (P ) is an assignment with the old names, the same assignment with the new names is y : y ia = y (i)a ; de…ne similarly x , and write P = (N; A; x ; r).
De…nition 1 An assignment rule F chooses for every P = (N; A; x; r) 2 P an assignment F (P ) = y 2 (P ), and meets the following properties:
Symmetry in N (N -SYM): for any P 2 P and bijection of N ,
Symmetry in A (A-SYM): same property after exchanging the roles of N and A Continuity (CONT) of the mapping P 3 (x; r) ! F (P ), for any …xed N; A We write F for the set of assignment rules.
The next property is critical. Given a rule F , a pair N; A, and a matrix y 2 R N A + , we say that y is F -fair if the rule F chooses y in the problem (N; A; x; r) where x i = y iA for all i, and r a = y N a for all a.
Consistency (CSY): every submatrix of an F -fair matrix is F -fair If x i = 0 for some i, then y ia = 0 for all a, so in the submatrix obtained after deleting row i all sums in rows and columns are the same. Consistency allows us to simply delete i altogether; similarly if r a = 0. Thus we can always assume for convenience x; r 0. Finally, the property of Converse Consistency ensures that global fairness can be veri…ed locally. It is an appealing property of the rules we discuss, but it will not be used in the characterization result.
Inverse Consistency (CSY 1 ): if every 2 2 submatrix of the N A matrix y is F -fair, then y is F -fair as well
Welfarist assignment rules
We introduce a rich family of consistent assignment rules. Fix a strictly convex and smooth function W on ]0; 1[, of which the derivative W 0 is continuous and strictly increasing on ]0; 1[. De…ne W (0) = lim z!+0 W (z), which could be +1, and W 0 (0) = lim z!0 W 0 (z), which could be 1.
De…nition 2
The W -welfarist assignment rule F W ( W -rule for short) selects at any P 2 P the assignment
It is well de…ned because W is strictly convex and (P ) is convex and compact. 
) is feasible in P and improves the objective. Finally Inverse Consistency is a consequence of statement iii) in Lemma 4 below, as explained in Section 6.
We give some examples. As discussed in the introduction, the most natural assignment rule is proportional : it guarantees that in any two rows (resp. columns) the proportions of any two resources (resp. agents'shares) are identical. Formally we have (recall s = x N = r A ):
() y 2 (P ) and y ia y jb = y ib y ja for all i; j; a; b This is F W in De…nition 2 if we choose for W the entropy function En(z) = z ln(z). The claim follows easily from the KKT optimality conditions applied to the convex and smooth program arg min (P ) P N A En(y ia ) (or from statement iii) in Lemma 4).
If we choose now W (z) = ln(z), the W -welfarist rule picks y maximizing the Nash product of all the entries y ia .
For W (z) = z 2 the W -welfarist rule chooses y minimizing the variance
All three rules just mentioned meet a familiar property:
Scale Invariance (SI): for any P 2 P and > 0, F ( P ) = F (P ), where P = (x; r) and P = ( x; r)
This axiom captures a one-dimensional family of welfarist assignment rules. Lemma 2: The W -welfarist assignment rule is scale invariant if and only if W is one of the following functions W q ; q 2 R: W 1 (z) = z ln(z) (the proportional rule) W q (z) = z q for q > 1 and for q < 0 W 0 (z) = ln(z) (maximizing the Nash product)
When q ! 1 the pointwise limits of the W q -rules are interesting in their own right, in particular because they are not welfarist in the sense of De…nition 2 but meet the same basic properties. If q ! 1 the limit of W q is the maxmin rule F 1 , choosing …rst the subset of (P ) where the smallest entry of y is as large as possible, then the sub-subset of those maximizing the next smallest entry, and so on. 2 Similarly when q ! +1 the W q -rule converges pointwise to the minmax rule F +1 , minimizing …rst the largest entry of y, then the next largest entry and so on.
The Symmetry and Consistency properties of F q are preserved by pointwise convergence, and a direct argument shows that both rules F 1 are continuous as well. They are also scale invariant.
Monotonicity and limit properties
We need three new axioms for our characterization result: (two variants of) a monotonicity property and two boundary conditions on individual shares.
The monotonicity property considers shifts of endowments toward a certain resource, that keeps total endowment constant; or shifts toward the allocation of a certain agent, leaving total allocation constant. In the former case we require that all agents get a weakly larger share of the resource in question, in the latter case that the agent in question gets a weakly larger share of every resource. As is often the case in separability results, we actually need a slightly stronger property guaranteeing strict increases in some cases.
To de…ne formally the two variants of the property we say that r 0 is an a-shift of r (where r; r 0 2 R x j for all j 6 = i and x 0 N = x N . In the two following de…nitions, y and y 0 refer to the assignments selected before and after the shift:
is an a-shift of r and 0 < y ia < x i for some i, then y ia < y 0 ia ; if x 0 is an i-shift of x and 0 < y ia < r a for some a, then y ia < y 0 ia
The main result uses two additional properties to pin down two sublasses of welfarist assignment rules. The …rst one rules out zero entries whenever possible: 2 The …rst step of this algorithm picks the smallest row-sum x i and the smallest columnsum ra, then …nds the smallest of , if the latter we …ll the a-column with equal entries ra jN j ; after substracting the corresponding entries from the column sums in the former case, and from the row sums in the latter case, we repeat.
Positive Entries (PE): …x any i; a and P = (N; A; x; r) with y = F (P )
The next property puts restrictions on problems where one entry is much larger than the others. Given a problem P = (N; A; x; r) the range of entry y ia for y 2 (P ) is the following interval [LB ia ; U B ia ]:
(with the notation (z) + = maxfz; 0g). In the statement of the next axiom, we …x N; A.
Bounded Entries (BE): for any i; a and any sequence P = (N; A; x ; r ), = 1; 2;
This says that an entry of the assignment that has to be (by feasibility) arbitrarily larger than any other entry, should be kept as small as permitted by feasibility.
Lemma 3 Remark 1 Another standard axiom in one-dimensional rationing is Ranking: a larger claim gets a weakly larger share of the resources. We de…ne two versions of the axiom, both of them useful in the proof of our main result (Section 8): Ranking (RKG): …x any i; j and P = (N; A; x; r) with y = F (P )
Ranking (RKG ): …x any i; j and P = (N; A; x; r) with y = F (P ) fx i > x j and y ia > 0g =) y ia > y ja for all a All welfarist rules meet both Ranking axioms. The "if" statements follow from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3. We give a rough sketch of the long proof of "only if", detailed in the Appendix.
First we apply the KKT conditions to program (1), and derive the critical additive structure structure of the assignment F W (P ) for any P . To state this result we use the extension of the inverse of W 0 to the entire real line. The domain of W 0 is R + [ f+1g and its range is the interval
. Thus is continuous, weakly increasing, and strictly so in the interval ]W 0 (0); W 0 (1)[.
Lemma 4
Fix P 2 P such that x; r 0, and an assignment y 2 (P ). The three following statements are equivalent:
Note that the equivalence holds also when some x i ; r a are zeros, provided we allow then i = 1, a = 1, and extend the domain of to include 1.
Lemma 4 implies that the matrix y is F W -fair if and only if it can be written in the additive form ii), and if and only if every 2 2 submatrix meets property iii). In particular this implies that
whenever these four entries of y are strictly positive. In some cases this gives a closed form of the assignment rule: for instance the proportional rule F is the inverse function so we still get y 0 and statements ii), iii) write:
for all i; j; a; bg but no closed form representation of y follows. Consider …nally F W 2 choosing the assignment with the smallest variance.
We have (z) = (z) + , and ii) gives y ia = ( i + a ) + . Therefore y ia + y jb = have y ia < x i . Change P to P 0 where
and the rest is as in P : by MON y 0 ia < y ia ; y 0 ja > y ja , and by N -SYM y 0 ia = y 0 ja . Finally CONT plus RKG together imply RKG.
y ib + y ja holds only when those entries are strictly positive. If all entries are, we get fy ia = i + a for all i; ag () fy ia + y jb = y ib + y ja for all i; j; a; bg We sketch now the proof of the Theorem. The …rst step associates a standard rationing rule to any rule F 2 F meeting CSY.
A rationing problem is (N; x; t), where x 2 R N + is the pro…le of demands, t 0 is the amount to be divided, and t x N . A rationing rule h …nds for every problem a division y = h(N; x; t) of t among N such that 0 y x and y N = t. Although a rationing problem is not a special case of an assignment problem (there is a single resource but budget balance does not hold), it is straightforward to adapt the de…nition of the properties N -SYM, CONT, and CSY.
For any F 2 F we de…ne h F as follows. Given a rationing problem (N; x; t) we construct the assignment problem P = (N; fa; bg; x; r) where r a = t and r b = x N t, and set h F (N; x; t) to be the a-column of F (P ). The rule h F meets SYM, CONT, and CSY so by Young's Theorem ( [25] ) h F is parametrized by a continuous function (x i ; ), weakly increasing in 2 R [ f 1; +1g and such that (x i ; 1) = 0 and (x i ; 1) = x i :
Moreover by A-SYM of F the rationing rule h F is self dual : in any problem (N; x; t) it distributes losses and gains in the same way
We use an alternative parametrization (z; ) of h F . For z 0 and 2 R, (z; ) solves the following equation in y i :
(where the index i is just to remind us that y i is one-dimensional). Thus z is the loss of an agent with demand z + y i . In fact existence of a solution to this equation is not guaranteed for all z; , so the actual proof has to proceed more carefully and use the additional assumptions MON , PE, and BE.
The key consequence of CSY is that if the matrix y is F -fair, for any two columns a; b there is a unique parameter ), for all z. Then CSY implies that the operation is associative, as well as continuous and strictly increasing, so by the well known Associativity Theorem ( [1] , [12] ) we get an additive representation of the form = g 1 (g( ) + g( )). We can rescale the parameters so that = + , and check that the range of ! (1; ) is R + .
Finally we take an arbitrary F -fair matrix y and …x a resource a. For every i there is i such that y ia = (1; i ). For every b 6 = a there is a b such that 
The solution y of (5) is strictly positive (provided x 0; t > 0) and is characterized by the existence of some 2 R such that
Thus a parametric representation of h as in (3) is
and is continuous and strictly increasing in both variables. For instance consider the Nash scale invariant rule F W 0 in Lemma 2: it de…nes the rationing rule h W 0 maximizing the product i y i (x i y i ), of which a parametrization is 
is …nite The solution of (5) may have some null coordinates, and the parametrization takes the following form:
For instance h 
An open question
Recall from Section 2 that a bilateral rationing problem P = (N; A; x; r) di¤ers from an assignment problem only in that the balancedness condition is replaced by the de…cit inequality P N x i P A r a . Then a feasible assignment y is a matrix in R N A + such that y N a = r a for all a, and y iA x i for all i. Consistency of the rule F becomes: if F (P ) = y and we drop resource a, the reduced problem P 0 = (N; A a; x 0 ; r a ) with the reduced claims x 0 i = x i y ia , has the same solution F (P 0 ) = y a ; and a similar statement holds if we drop an agent i and reduce the amount of resource a to r a y ia . As noted in [16] , [17] , for any strictly convex function W and convex function V , the program arg min y P N A W (y ia ) + P N V (x i y iA ) delivers a consistent (as well as symmetric and continuous) bilateral rationing rule. Extending the characterization result of our Theorem to bilateral rationing, with the help of appropriate monotonicity and boundary assumptions, is worthy of future research.
Asymmetric assignment rules
Symmetry is a critical assumption in Young's Theorem for standard rationing problems. It is easy to de…ne asymmetric consistent rationing rules by minimizing P i V i (x i ; y i ), but it has proven di¢ cult to capture the entire class of Consistent and Continuous rules. A ‡urry of recent literature characterizes a variety of interesting subclasses: [13] , [6] , [24] , [19] , [20] , [9] . In our assignment model, an obvious family of asymmetric consistent assignment rules minimizes a welfarist objective of the form
A challenging open question is to capture all or part of this family under additional axiomatic requirements.
8 Appendix: proofs
Lemma 2
The result plays no essential role so we only sketch its proof.That all rules F 
Assume for simplicty that W 0 is di¤erentiable (it must be so almost everywhere; we omit the details of the general argument). Fix a; c, and ; for any small enough " there exists > 0 such that 
By the equivalence above, this amounts to
W 0 ( a + ") W 0 ( a) = W 0 ( c + ") W 0 ( c). Therefore W 00 (a) W 00 (c) = o(") and W 00 ( a) W 00 ( c) = o("),
Lemma 4
We prove Lemma 4 before Lemma 3 because it is used in the proof of the latter.
We must show that the three following statements are equivalent:
The assignment y minimizes P N A W (y ia ) under the following equality and inequality constraints:
From jN Aj 2 maxfjN j; jAjg the linear mapping R N A 3 y ! (y iA ; y N a ) 2 R N [A is of maximal rank. Also there is some feasible and strictly positive y because x; r 0, hence the quali…cation constraints hold. Therefore there exist some KKT multipliers ; ; , such that If y = F W (P ) it cancels the derivative of L(y; ; ; ):
Conversely pick a feasible y as in statement ii): y ia = ( i + a ) implies W 0 (y ia ) i + a , therefore y cancels the derivative of L(y; ; ; ) for some meeting the complementarity conditions 3) above. As L is strictly convex and smooth this means that y is the absolute minimum of L(y; ; ; ) and we conclude y = F W (P ).
Statement ii) =) iii) Pick y 2 (P ) and 2 R N ; 2 R A as in ii). Fix any i; j; a; b such that y ib ; y ja are both strictly positive: we must show Statement iii) =) ii) Fixing a matrix y meeting iii), we must show that y = F W (P ). We proceed by induction on the number of zeros in y. If y 0 property iii) gives the diagonal equality
for all i; j; a; b. Fixing agent 1 and resource a we write this as y jb = (W 0 (y 1b )+ W 0 (y ja ) W 0 (y 1a )) for all j; b. Setting j = W 0 (y ja ) W 0 (y 1a ) and b = W 0 (y 1b ) gives the parametrization of y in ii), so we are done. Next we assume the claim proven for up to K zeros in y, and assume y has K + 1 zeros. Fix 1; a such that y 1a = 0 and de…ne A + = fajy 1a > 0g and A 0 = fa 6 = a jy 1a = 0g, and N + = fijy ia > 0g; N 0 = fi 6 = 1jy ia = 0g, where both A + and N + are non empty. Note that for all i 2 N + ; a 2
. Then y ia > 0 and the following diagonal equality holds:
The inductive assumption implies that the (N 1) (A a )-submatrix of y is F W -fair, so by property ii) there exist 2 R N 1 ; 2 R A a such that y ia = ( i + a ) for all i 6 = 1; a 6 = a . We extend this de…nition to 1 and a as follows
and we check …rst that these de…nitions makes sense. The sum in (7) does not depend on i; j 2 N + if i W 0 (y ia ) = j W 0 (y ja ) which follows from (6) and W 0 (y ia ) = i + a in N + A + . The same sum does not depend on a;
which is the diagonal equality in f1; ig fa; bg where all entries of y are strictly positive. A similar argument shows that (8) de…nes a unambiguously.
It remains to check the equality y ia = ( i + a ) in (f1g A) [ (N fa g). We prove this in f1g A and omit the similar argument in N fa g. Together (7), (8) and (6) give
Next for a 6 = a the de…nition (7) gives 1 + a = i + a +W 0 (y 1a ) W 0 (y ia ) for any i 2 N + . Distinguish two cases. If a 2 A + we showed above W 0 (y ia ) = i + a therefore 1 + a = W 0 (y 1a ) so we are done. If a 2 A 0 we have y 1a = 0 and y ia = ( i + a ). By construction of we have W 0 ( ( )) for all , hence
ad we conclude ( 1 + a ) = 0 = y 1a as desired. This completes the induction step.
Remark 4 The maxmin rule F 1 and the minmax rule F +1 are not adressed by Lemma 4 because they are not welfarist. But they can be parametrized in very similar way.
1 Fix P 2 P and y 2 (P ). The three following statements are equivalent i) y = F 1 (P ) (resp. y = F +1 (P )) ii) there exist two vectors 2 R N + ; 2 R A + such that y ia = minf i ; a g for all i; a (resp. y ia = maxf i ; a g for all i; a) iii) minfy ia ; y jb g = minfy ib ; y ja g for all i; j; a; b (resp. maxfy ia ; y jb g = maxfy ib ; y ja g for all i; j; a; b)
In particular the two rules F 1 are inverse consistent. We give the proof for the maxmin rule, the proof for the minmax rule is similar. We show …rst that statements ii) and iii) are equivalent. Clearly ii) =) iii). Now assume iii) and set = min ia y ia : for any i 6 = j and a 6 = b fy ia > and y jb > g =) fy ib > and y ja > g. Therefore fiajy ia > g is a rectangle, and its complement C is a union of rows and columns. We set i = a = for all such columns and rows (typically a single row or column). Then we repeat this construction inside (N A) C, …nd the union C 0 or columns and/or rows where y ia is minimal, and set i ; a as this smallest value 0 . Now for every entry ia where each coordinate is in C [ C 0 the desired equality y ia = minf i ; a g holds. Moreover C [ C 0 is also a union of rows and columns, so the iteration is now clear.
We check next i) =) iii). Fix P 2 P and y = F 1 (P ) and call k 1 ; k 2 ; ; k p ; , the sequence of columns or rows successively …lled in the algorithm de…ning y. Each entry y ia appears in exactly one such column or row denoted k p(ia) . Moreover all entries appearing in k p are equal to some z p and the sequence z p is weakly increasing. Note that if z p = z p+1 the order in which they appear is arbitrary. For any i; j; a; b if p = p(ia) is the earliest appearance among the four entries of f; i; jg fa; bg, then y ib = y ia = z p and/or y ja = y ia = z p ; if y ib = z p then y jb ; y ja z p as they appear later, so minfy ia ; y jb g = minfy ib ; y ja g; the argument is similar if y ja = z p , completing the proof.
We show …nally ii) =) i). Assume y is feasible and y ia = minf i ; a g for all i; a. Suppose i = min j;a f j ; a g so that y ia = i = xi jAj for all a: clearly x i = min j x j and r a = y N a jN j i implying ra jN j xi jAj for all a. Therefore row i is the …rst step in the algorithm de…ning F 1 (P ); then we iterate by choosing the smallest among the remaining j ; a , and so on.
Lemma 3
We …x a welfarist rule F W throughout the proof. Statement i) For any two problems P; P 0 , with y = F W (P );
where the latter comes from the parametric representation in statement ii) of Lemma 4. The following facts are easily checked, and require no assumption on the shift from P to P 0 . First because is weakly increasing
For all i; j; a; b, the identity @ ia + @ jb = @ ib + @ ja gives f@ ia ; @ jb 0; @ ib 0; with at least one strict inequalityg =) @ ja > 0g (9)
Now we …x P; P 0 as in the premises of MON with a 1 the resource increasing strictly in size.
Step 1 We show …rst y ia y 0 ia for all i, i.e., property MON. We assume y 1a1 > y 0 1a1 () d 1a1 < 0 and derive a contradiction. Note that @ 1a1 < 0 as well. Because x 1 is the same in P and P 0 there is some a 2 such that d 1a2 > 0, hence @ 1a2 > 0 as well. As r a2 decreases weakly there is some agent 2 such that d 2a2 ; @ 2a2 < 0. Applying (9) to 1; 2; a 1 ; a 2 (with a change of sign) we get @ 2a1 < 0 and d 2a1 0 (but we cannot claim d 2a1 < 0 as y 2a1 ; y 0 2a1 could both be zero). We have shown
We cannot have A = fa 1 ; a 2 g because d 2a1 0; d 2a2 < 0 but x 2 does not change. Thus we can pick a 3 such that d 2a3 ; @ 2a3 > 0. Now we apply (9) to 1; 2; a 2 ; a 3 to get @ 1a3 > 0 and d 1a3 0; as r a3 decreases weakly there some agent 3 such that d 3a3 ; @ 3a3 < 0 (so N 6 = f1; 2g). Applying (9) successively to 1; 3; a 1 ; a 3 and to 2; 3; a 2 ; a 3 we get @ 3a1 ; @ 3a2 < 0 hence d 3a1 ; d 3a2 0, so we have now f@ ka l < 0 for 1 l k 3g and f@ ka l > 0 for 1 k < l 3g (10)
As above we cannot have A = fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 g because d 3a1 + d 3a3 + d 3a3 < 0 and x 3 stays put. The induction pattern is now clear: we can choose a 4 such that d 3a4 > 0; after using (9) to show @ ka4 > 0; d ka4 0 for k = 1; 2, we can choose 4 2 N such that d 4a4 < 0 and show @ 4a l < 0 for l = 1; 2; 3; then we reach the pattern (10) where 4 replaces 3, and again we cannot have exhausted A. The contradiction follows because N and A are …nite.
Step 2 Now we consider an entry 1a 1 such that 0 < y 1a1 < x 1 . By step 1 we have y 1a1 y 0 1a1 and we must prove y 1a1 = y 0 1a1 is impossible. We assume this equality and derive a contradiction. Thus d 1a1 = 0, and @ 1a1 = 0 as well because y 1a1 > 0 and increases strictly when it takes positive values. We distinguish two cases. Case 1 We assume there is at least one resource a 2 such that d 1a2 > 0, hence @ 1a2 > 0 as well. Then we proceed exactly as in Step 1 to construct agent 2, resource a 3 , agent 4, etc..The only di¤erence is that d 1a1 ; @ 1a1 = 0 instead of d 1a1 ; @ 1a1 < 0, but each time the application of (9) involves entry 1a 1 the equality @ 1a1 = 0 is enough. And in the pattern (10) we make an exception for @ 1a1 . Then we derive the same contradiction. Case 2 We are left with the case where d 1a 0 for all a 6 = a 1 . Because d 1a1 = 0 and x 1 is constant, this gives d 1a = 0 for all a. This does not allow in general to sign @ 1a if y 1a = 0. But the premises of MON specify y 1a1 > 0 and increases strictly when it takes positive values, therefore @ 1a1 = 0. Furthermore y 1a1 < x 1 implies there exists some a 2 such that y 1a2 > 0, therefore @ 1a2 = 0 as well. As r a1 < r 0 a1 , there an agent 2 such that d 2a1 > 0, and @ 2a1 > 0 as well. Apply now (9) to 1; 2; a 1 ; a 2 , to get @ 2a2 > 0 hence d 2a2 0. As x 2 is constant and d 2a1 + d 2a2 > 0 there is an a 3 such that d 2a3 ; @ 2a3 < 0. Again (9) at 1; 2; a 1 ; a 3 gives @ 1a3 < 0, but as d 1a3 = 0 we get y 1a3 = y 0 1a3 = 0. Check y 2a2 > 0: indeed d 2a3 < 0 gives y 2a3 > 0 so y 2a2 = 0 would give the f1; 2g fa 2 ; a 3 g-submatrix of y: y 1a2 0 0 y 2a3 , with the diagonal terms strictly positive, in contradiction of statement iii) in Lemma 3. Now y 2a2 ; @ 2a2 > 0 imply d 2a2 > 0, and in turn d 1a2 + d 2a2 > 0 while r a2 decreases at least weakly: so there is an agent 3 such that d 3a2 ; @ 3a2 < 0. Apply (9) at 1; 3; a 1 ; a 2 and at 2; 3; a 2 ; a 3 to get respectively @ 3a1 < 0 ) d 3a1 0 and @ 3a3 < 0 ) d 3a3 0, and …nally d 3a1 + d 3a2 + d 3a3 < 0 while x 3 stays put. Then we can pick a 4 such that d 3a4 ; @ 3a4 > 0.
From then on we construct sequences 3; 4; 5; , and a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ; a 4 ; , such that @ ka l < 0 for 3 l k, and @ ka l > 0 for 1 k < l For instance to pick agent 4 we check …rst @ 1a4 ; @ 2a4 > 0 by (9) at 1; 3; a 1 ; a 4 then at 2; 3; a 1 ; a 4 , so that d 1a4 ; d 2a4 0 and
Then as usual there is some 4 such that d 4a4 ; @ 4a4 < 0, and we check @ 4a l < 0 for l = 1; 2; 3, by (9) at 3; 4; a l ; a 4 . And so on. This construction cannot stop, so we reach a contradiction. Statement ii) If for some problem P and some entry of y = F W (P ) we have y ia = 0, then by statement ii) in Lemma 4 and the construction of we get
is …nite, by continuity of W 0 there is some z; 0 < z < 1, such that W 0 (1) + W 0 (0) > 2W 0 (z). Then in the 2 2 problem P = (f1; 2g; fa; bg; x = (1 + z; z); r = (1 + z; z)) the rule F W chooses 1 z z 0 .
Statement iii)
The function for large values of z is as follows: Case 1: W 0 (1) = 1, then ( ) is always …nite and lim !1 ( ) = 1 Case 2: W 0 (1) = C < 1, then lim !C ( ) = 1, and ( ) = 1 for C We must show that F W meets BE in case 1, but not in case 2. In case 1 pick i; a and a sequence of problems P t = (N; A; x t ; r t ) as in the premises of BE; by statement ii) of Lemma 4 there are parameters In case 2 we invoke the continuity of W 0 to choose z such that
Then we consider the sequence P t = (f1; 2g; fa; bg; x t = (1+t; z); r t = (1+t;
(1 + t z)) ! 0 ,as requested by BE, then y t 2b ! 0 by feasibility. By construction of the statement (2
which contradicts z = ( t + t ) + (2 t ) for all t.
Theorem
We only need to prove the "only if" statement. We …x an assignment rule F meeting CSY and MON .
Step 1 We discuss properties of the rationing rule h F associated with F , de…ned after the statement of the Theorem.
We write simply h in lieu of h F from now on, and choose a parametrization (x i ; ) of h as in (3). Recall 2 R [ f 1; +1g, is continuous and weakly increasing in , and (x i ; 1) = 0, (x i ; 1) = x i . In particular (0; ) = 0 for all . Without loss of generality we assume that is "proper" in the sense that the two functions ( ; ) and ( ; 0 ) are di¤erent if 6 = 0 . Self-duality of h ((4)) implies h(N; x;
x N 2 ) = 1 2 x, therefore there is a parameter such that (x i ; ) = xi 2 for all x i . In all examples of welfarist rules in Figures 1 to 5 , we have = 0. We will say that is low if < and high if > . For a low we have (z; ) z 2 therefore we can have z > 0 and (z; ) = 0, but not z > 0 and (z; ) = z; for a high the latter is possible but not the former.
Ranking (Remark 1 Section 5) implies at once that (z; ) increases weakly in z. By self-duality x i > x j =) x i h i (N; x; t) x j h j (N; x; t), which then means that (z; ) is weakly 1-contracting in z:
For a low we set = supfzj (z; ) = 0g so that (z; ) = 0 exactly on [0; ] and (z; ) < z for all z.
For a high we set = supfzj (z; ) = zg so that (z; ) = z exactly on [0; ] (by weak 1-contraction) and (z; ) > 0 for all z > 0.
Whether is high or low, we say that z is -regular if z 2] ; 1[, i.e., if 0 < (z; ) < z. Note that all values are -regular, while there is no 1-regular value.
For the scale invariant welfarist rules F ( Figure 5 ) has = p j j. Property MON applied to two-resource problems implies that t ! h i (N; x; t) is strictly increasing whenever 0 < h i (N; x; t) < x i , for all i. This in turn means that (z; ) increases strictly in at -regular values. Suppose, on the contrary, 0 < (z; ) = (z; 0 ) < z and < 0 . Because is proper there is some z 0 such that (z 0 ; ) < (z 0 ; 0 ), but then the strict monotonicity of t ! h i (N; x; t) is violated going from (f1; 2g; (z; z 0 ); (z; ) + (z 0 ; )) to (f1; 2g; (z; z 0 ); (z; 0 ) + (z 0 ; 0 )). Ranking implies similarly fx i > x j , t > 0, and h i (N; x; t) > 0g =) h i (N; x; t) > h j (N; x; t). From this we see easily that (z; ) increases strictly in z whenever (z; ) > 0. Apply RKG to the dual of h, which is h itself, to get fx i > x j , t < x N , and h i (N; x; t) < x i g =) x i h i (N; x; t) > x j h j (N; x; t). Therefore (z; ) is strictly 1-contracting in z whenever (z; ) < z. Gathering our results we have shown (z; ) increases strictly in z whenever (z; ) > 0, which is true for all z > 0 if , and all -regular values if < (z; ) increases strictly in at all -regular values (z; ) is strictly 1-contracting in z at all -regular values: for all z 0 2 R
Fix and consider a pair N; x, such that jN j 2 and each x i is -regular. Self duality applied to the problem (N; x; t = P N (x i ; )) implies there is some 0 such that (x i ; ) + (x i ; 0 ) = x i for all i. Fix and take two pairs N; x, N 0 ; x 0 such that N; N 0 overlap but are not nested: because increases strictly in for those values of x i ; x 0 i , the parameter 0 is the same for N; x and N 0 ; x 0 ; therefore it does not depend on N; x at all. This de…nes the "inverse" 1 of by the identity (z; ) + (z;
for all -regular values z. Moreover ( 1 ) 1 = . In particular ( ) 1 = and 1 1 = 1. Note that 1 is high if and only if is low and vice versa,because (z; ) = z 2 . We check now = 1 and that (12) holds in fact for all z. Suppose is low. Then (12) holds for z = by CONT, and implies
1
. The opposite inequality obtains by applying (12) at 1 . Now (12) holds as well on [0; ] by de…nition of ; 1 .
Step 2 We de…ne an alternative parametrization (z; ) of the rationing rule h.
Keep in mind that in this step all variables are of dimension 1.
For all z 0 and 1 +1, (z; ) solves the following equation in y : y = (z; ) , y = (z + y; )
Such a solution may not exist: for instance if = +1 it boils down to y = z +y.
On the other hand for = 1 we have (z; 1) = 0 for all z i , and (z; ) = z 2 implies (z; ) = z for all z, so is well de…ned for = 1; . We claim that if is low, < , (z; ) is uniquely de…ned for all z. We have 0 (z + 0; ) and (z + y; ) (z + y; ) = z+y 2 y for y z, so (13) has a solution by continuity of in z. Suppose z is -regular and (13) has two solutions y; y 0 and y < y 0 : then (z + y 0 ; ) (z + y; ) = y 0 y, a contradiction of the 1-contracting property (11) because z + y is still -regular. Now if z one solution of (13) is y = 0, and if there was another solution y 0 , z + y 0 would be -regular and the previous argument would apply. This proves the claim, and that (z; ) = 0 for z . We turn to the case of a high value > , where two di¢ culties arise. First equation (13) Figure 3 . We claim that for a high equation (13) has a solution if and only if z < . Fix such a pair z; , and choose x such that z < x (x; ) () (z + y; ) < y for y = x z, so the "if"statement follows as above by continuity of in z and 0 (z + 0; ). If z , then x (x; ) < z for all x as x (x; ) increases strictly. Hence y < (z + y; ) for y = x z, where y ranges over R + , and the claim is proven. Now for a low value we have = 1, so the claim is true for all .
To sum up, (z; ) is de…ned for all z < and only there; it is then singlevalued, except possibly at zero if > : (0; ) = [0; ].
Moreover we have the following self-duality properties, for all ; 1 +1: lim
The …rst statement is clear for = 1. For 2 R note that (12) and (14) together imply 1 = lim x!1 (x; ). If = 1 the equality lim z!1 (z; ) = lim x!1 (x; ) is clear by de…nition of . If < 1, then and 1 = 1, so we must check lim z! (z; ) = 1. Fix an arbitrary large w > 0, x such that x > w + , and z such that x (x; ) < z < . Then (z; ) is well de…ned and (z + (x z); ) > (x z) implying (z; ) > (x z) because is 1-contracting in z, and in turn (z; ) > w. The second statement follows from (12) once we see that y < 1 is a consequence of lim z! (z; ) = 1 . Clearly is continuous in (z; ) because is so the graph of is closed. In particular for > the correspondence z ! (z; ) is upper-heni continuous at 0.
We check …nally the monotonicity properties of : (z; ) increases weakly in z and (z; ) increases strictly in z if and z , and if > (z; ) increases strictly in if and z , and if > and z > 0
For the second claim …x , z; z 0 such that < z < z 0 , and set y = (z; ); y 0 = (z 0 ; ). Then ( ; ) increases strictly from z +y to z 0 +y, therefore y < (z 0 +y; ), while y 0 = (z 0 +y 0 ; ); so y 0 = y is impossible, and y 0 < y implies that t ! t (z 0 +t; ) decreases from y 0 to y, in contradiction of (11) . Next take > , z; z 0 such that 0 < z < z 0 < , and set y = (z; ); y 0 = (z 0 ; ). We showed in step 1 that ( ; ) increases strictly everywhere, moreover y; y 0 > implies that ( ; ) is strictly 1-contracting between z + y and z 0 + y 0 , therefore the same argument applies. The case z = 0 < z 0 is left to the reader for brevity. For the third claim …x ; 0 such that < 0 , z 0 and y = (z; ); y 0 = (z; 0 ). As increases strictly in (shown in step 1) we have y < (z + y; 0 ), while y 0 = (z + y 0 ; 0 ). Thus y 0 y contradicts (11) exactly as in the previous paragraph. For the case < 0 , 0 < z < 0 , and y = (z; ); y 0 = (z; 0 ), we have y > ; y 0 > 0 , so z + y is -regular: therefore (z + y; ) increases strictly from to 0 , and the contracting property (11) holds, so the same argument applies.
Finally (z; ) = 0 whenever z < implies the …rst claim.
Step 3 The role of assumptions PE and BE.
Positive Entries implies h i (N; x; t) > 0 if x i ; t > 0. This is clearly equivalent to (x i ; ) > 0 when x i > 0 and > 1 (recall from Step 1 that is a proper parametrization). By de…nition of , we deduce = 0 for a low . Now ! 1 exchanges low and high values, and we showed = 1 at the end of step1. So for all > 1 we have = 0, i.e., all positive values are -regular. In particular PE implies 0 so (z; ) > 0 if and only if z > 0; also (z; ) is single-valued , continuous, and strictly increasing in both variables everywhere on 0 z < : for low we have = 1; for high , (z; ) is not de…ned for z . Applying Bounded Entries to the sequence of assignment problems (N; (x 1 + ; x 1 ); (t; x N + t)) we see that h(N; (x 1 + ; x 1 ); t) = y ! (t; 0 1 ) as goes to 1. We check that this implies lim x!1 (x; ) = 1 for all > 1. Assume is such that lim x!1 (x; ) = ! < 1 and derive a contradiction. Note …rst that must be low. Choose w such that (w; ) = 3 4 !, and x 1 large enough that it is -regular and x 1 > w. Consider the solution ( (x 1 ; 0 ); (w; 0 )) of the two-person problem (f1; 2g; (x 1 ; w); t = 3 2 !): from x 1 > w, (w; )+ (w; ) = t, and ( ; ) increases strictly by -regularity, we deduce 0 < . Thus
so that (w; 0 ) ! 2 no matter how large x 1 , a contradiction of BE. Pick now a low , and recall from step 2 that (z; ) is de…ned for all z. By the very de…nition (13) of , lim z!1 (z; ) = 1 implies lim z!1 (z; ) = 1, and by (15) this gives 1 = 1, in other word (z; 1 ) is de…ned for all z as well. We have shown
BE implies
1: (z; ) is de…ned and continuous everywhere; for low it is zero i¤ 0 z and for high we have (0; ) = [0; ]; elsewhere (z; ) strictly increases in both variables.
Step 4 We characterize the F -fairness of the matrix y 2 R and a is in A + . Therefore X
Sum up all columns in A
Step 5 We de…ne an inner product for the parameters ; 2 R, not necessarily distinct.
We use the equality ( (z; ); ) = (z; ), for all z such that ( (z; ); ) is well de…ned. Problems can arise if z is too large, i.e., z or (z; ) , then the expression is not de…ned; or if z is too small, i.e., z < so (z; ) = 0 and ( (z; ); ) is multi-valued. Our assumptions PE or BE allow us to focus on one type of problem only. Case 1 PE holds We claim that ( (z; ); ) is well de…ned if and only if z < ( ; 1 ), with the convention (z; ) = 1 if z . Supose …rst so that (z; ) is well de…ned for all z and we only need (z; ) <
. By (15) we have lim z!1 (z; ) = 1 , so there are no restrictions on z if 1 , just as we claim: ( ; 1 ) = = 1. If on the other hand < 1 , then the only restriction is (z; ) < () z < ( ; 1 ) (by (16) ). Suppose next > , then we need z < and (z; ) < . Now lim z! (z; ) = 1 = 1. If < 1 we have (z; ) < () z < ( ; 1 ) and ( ; 1 ) < lim z!1 (z; 1 ) = , proving the claim. If = 1, we only need z < , and with our convention ( ; 1 ) = . The claim is proven. Case 2 BE holds We claim that ( (z; ); ) is well de…ned and strictly positive if z > ( ; 1 ). Recall from step 3 that (z; ) is well de…ned everywhere, single valued if z > 0; and strictly positive if z > . To ensure ( (z; ); ) > 0 we need and/or (z; ) > ; by (16) the latter inequality is z > ( ; 1 ).
De…ning
. We …x ; and set in case 1 J( ; ) =]0; ( ; 1 )[, while in case 2 J( ; ) =] ( ; 1 ); 1[. We also choose A = fa; b; cg and some N with jN j 3. For an arbitrary pro…le z = (z i ) 2 J( ; ) N we construct the N fa; b; cg assignment matrix y with strictly positive entries:
Setting z 0 i = y ib , and using (16) , an equivalent description of the matrix is
The matrix y is F -fair by Fact 2 in step 4 applied to the latter description of y.
By Fact 1 applied to the former description of y, there exists a parameter such that y ic = (y ia ; ). Thus we have ( (z i ; ); ) = (z i ; ) for all z i . Clearly is unique because (z i ; ) increases strictly in (step 2), and in fact it does not depend at all on the choice of the z i -s: if we take two pro…les N; z and N 0 ; z 0 such that N; N 0 overlap in at least one coordinate z 1 = z 0 1 , then (z 1 ; ) is the same for both pro…les, implying that did not change. We de…ne = and we have ( (z; ); ) = (z; ) for all z 2 J( ; )
The identity (z; ) = z means that is the neutral element of this operation, and (16) implies 1 = . Note that we do not de…ne when one of them is 1.
Step 6 We show that is an associative product, and derive an additive representation of this operation from the Associativity Functional Equation ( [1] , [12] ).
For any three parameters ; ; v, associativity follows the repeated application of (18) where those expressions are all well de…ned for z in a positive interval [0; K[ if PE holds, or in an interval ]K; 1[ if BE is true. For instance under PE ( ( (z; ); ); v) is well de…ned whenever (z; ) is well de…ned, and (z; ) < ( v ; 1 ), which amounts to z < and z < ( ( v ; 1 ); 1 ). We omit the similar arguments for the other four terms, and under assumption BE.
Associativity of implies the identity ( ) ( . We check now that ( ; ) ! is continuous and strictly increasing in both variables. For continuity pick any two ; and observe that in a small enough neighborhood of ( ; ), equation (18) in z holds on a non empty open interval: under PE this is because ( ; 1 ) decreases weakly in both and ; under BE the same is true of ( ; 1 ). As is strictly monotonic in both variables by construction, the product is de…ned in this neighborhood of ( ; ) by equation (18) at a single value z: therefore the graph of ( ; ) ! is closed by continuity of , so this mapping is continuous at ( ; ). By the same argument it increases strictly in and .
By the Associativity Theorem (section 6.2 in [1] ) an associative, continuous, and strictly monotonic product in R is represented as follows by a continuous and strictly increasing function g on R:
= g 1 (g( ) + g( )) for all ; 2 R
In particular g( ) = 0 is the neutral element, and 1 = becomes g( 1 ) = g( ). Thus g is an homeomorphism of R into its range, and its range must be R: it is an interval stable by addition and symmetry around 0. We use now the new variable = g( ) to parametrize the rationing rule h: we set e (z; ) = (z; g 1 ( )) for 2 R, and e (z; 1) = 0, e (z; +1) = z. The rule h is still represented by e through property (3) , and the entire discussion of steps 1 to 5, including the de…nition of e through (13), the domain restrictions captured by the critical parameters e = g 1 ( ) , e = g 1 ( ) , and the regularity properties of e and e , are preserved. The advantage of this parametrization is that equation (18) takes the form e (e (z; ); ) = e (z; + ) for all z 2 J( ; )
Now the duality operation is just 1 = and = 0.
Step 7 We show that F is a W -welfarist assignment rule.
The goal is to construct the function in statement ii) of Lemma 3, then derive W from = W 0 1 . First we check that the range of ! e (1; ) over all for which it is de…ned (i.e., such that 1 < e ), is R + . By continuity of e , for any > 0 there exists such that e ( + 1; ) = 0, because this expression is > 0 at = 1 and 1 at = 1. This equality is just = e (1; ). Note that e (1; ) is de…ned for all 0 (by step 2, e.g., e (1; 0) = 1) and for <, where C = minf je 1g (by step 2 (z; ) is de…ned i¤ z < ). Under BE we have C = +1, but this is not necessarily the case under PE.
We pick now an arbitrary problem P = (N; A; x; r) with all x i ; r a > 0, and set y = F (N; A; x; r). Fix an arbitrary a 2 A and use Fact 1 in step 4: for each b 6 = a there is a parameter b such that y [b] = e (y [a] ; b ). On the other hand the argument in the previous paragraph shows that for each i there is a parameter i such that y ia = e (1; i ). Combining these equations and (19) gives y ib = e (y ia ; b ) = e (e (1; i ) ; b ) = e (1; i + b ) for all i, all b 2 A a. We set a = 0 so that we have 
Now we de…ne from R [ f 1g onto R + :
( 1) = 0 ; ( ) = e (1; ) if 1 < < C ; ( ) = 1 if C From the properties of e in step 2 is continuous and weakly increasing, strictly so if ( ) > 0; also (0) = 1. From the more detailed properties in step 3 we have also ! if PE holds C may be …nite, and is an increasing homeomorphism from 
